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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Lori Ann Phillips appeals from her judgment of conviction for two counts of 
delivery of methamphetamine. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
An informant arranged to purchase methamphetamine from Phillips. (Trial 
Tr., p. 28, L. 23 - p. 29, L. 21; p. 31, L. 12 - p. 32, L. 10.) Monitored by police 
officers, the informant purchased about an ounce of methamphetamine from 
Phillips on March 3, 2009. (Trial Tr., p. 32, L. 11 - p. 40, L. 12; p. 43, L. 11 - p. 
44, L. 8; p. 94, L. 18-p. 101, L. 8; p. 124, L. 19- p. 128, L. 11; p. 157, L. 13- p. 
166, L. 13; p. 178, L. 11 - p. 180, L. 2; p. 182, L. 8 - p. 190, L. 4; State's Exhibit 
1.1) Police conducted another controlled buy, in which Phillips again delivered 
about an ounce of methamphetamine to the informant, on March 12, 2009. (Trial 
Tr., p. 46, L.10-p. 53, L.19; p.101, L. 9-p. 104, L.13; p.128, L.12-p.129, 
L. 12; p. 167, L. 7 - p. 169, L. 1; p. 190, L. 10 - p. 194, L. 21; State's Exhibit 2.) 
The second delivery, on March 12, 2009, was recorded. (Trial Tr., p. 55, L. 17 -
p. 59, L. 16; p. 61, L. 8 - p. 62, L. 9; p. 196, L. 23 - p. 199, L. 25; State's Exhibits 
3, 4, and 6.2) 
The state charged Phillips with two counts of delivery of 
methamphetamine for twice delivering approximately an ounce of metham-
1 State's Exhibits 1 and 2 contained methamphetamine and were not, per rule, 
provided to the appellate Court. They are cited here merely for reference. 
2 Only State's Exhibit 6 was admitted. State's Exhibits 3 and 4 were the 
recording before it was edited for admission. 
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phetamine. (R., pp, 102-04; see R., pp. 39-41; 58-60; 90-92.) At the trial the 
defense objected to part of the audio recording of the March 12 transaction in 
which Phillips and the informant discussed the possibility of future sales. (Trial 
Tr., p. 141, L. 11-p. 145, L. 16; p. 146, L.13-p. 147, L. 7.) The jury thereafter 
heard evidence that during the March 12 drug transaction Phillips and the 
informant discussed the possibility of Phillips selling four more ounces to the 
informant in the future. (Trial Tr., p. 199, Ls. 17-25; State's Exhibit 6.) 
The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. (R., p. 185.) The district 
court entered judgment, sentencing Phillips to consecutive terms of ten years 
with three years fixed on each count. (R., pp. 203-05.) Philips timely appealed. 
(R., pp. 214-16.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Phillips states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the 
portion of Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, which involved conversations 
between the confidential informant and Ms. Phillips about 
obtaining much larger quantities of methamphetamine for a 
future sale because it was not relevant and was overly 
prejudicial? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, 
upon Ms. Phillips, unified sentences of ten years, with three 
years fixed, to be served consecutively, following her 
conviction for two counts of delivery of a controlled 
substance, methamphetamine? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. 
Phillips' Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of 
Sentence? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Phillips failed to show reversible error in the district court's conclusion 
that further redaction of the recording of the second drug transaction was 
not warranted? 
2. Has Phillips failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Phillips Has Failed To Show Reversible Error In The District Court's Conclusion 
That Further Redaction Of The Recording Of The Second Drug Transaction Was 
Not Warranted 
A. Introduction 
Phillips objected to evidence showing she and the informant discussed 
future drug sales at the March 12 drug sale on grounds that the evidence was 
irrelevant and prejudicial. (Trial Tr., p. 141, L. 18 - p. 142, L. 8.) The district 
court ultimately held that portions of the conversation between Phillips and the 
informant about what third parties owed Phillips for drugs was not admissible but 
that discussion between Phillips and the informant about future possible drug 
transactions was corroborative of the informant and would assist the jury to 
weigh his testimony about the drug transactions. (Trial Tr., p. 144, L. 11 - p. 
147, L. 7.) On appeal Phillips argues that the portion of the recording in which 
potential future sales were discussed was irrelevant because "[e]vidence 
regarding a larger, possible, future sale does not make it more or less probable 
that Ms. Phillips had committed the charged crimes in this case." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 5.) She further argues that the evidence was prejudicial because it 
showed she was "very dangerous" and a "substantial threat to society." 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.) 
Contrary to Phillips' arguments, hearing Phillips discuss possible future 
drug transactions with the informant in her own voice was highly corroborative of 
the confidential informant in that it tended to show that he was not the source of 
the methamphetamine and that Phillips was, and that probative value was 
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certainly not outweighed by any prejudice attending evidence that the woman 
who had already delivered two ounces of methamphetamine would consider a 
future delivery of four more ounces. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The relevancy of evidence is an issue of law subject to free review. State 
v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 P.2d 596, 602 (1993). Once relevance 
has been established, the district court's determination that the evidence's 
probative value is not outweighed by unfair prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 603, 809 P.2d 455, 464 (1991). 
C. Phillips Has Shown No Error In The Admission Of Evidence That At The 
Second Drug Sale She And The Informant Discussed Possible Future 
Drug Sales 
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. I.R.E. 401, 402. Evidence 
is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401; State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 
544, 768 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1989). Evidence reflecting on the credibility of 
witnesses is relevant. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 
(201 O); State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 671, 227 P.3d 918, 925 (2010). 
In this case the only direct evidence that Phillips had twice delivered large 
quantities of methamphetamine was the testimony of an informant. (Trial Tr., p. 
179, Ls. 7-19.) The informant was cooperating with police in exchange for a 
lesser sentence on his own charges. (Trial Tr., p. 180, Ls. 3-20.) With such an 
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obvious credibility problem from the only witness with direct evidence of the drug 
transactions, the state's case relied heavily upon circumstantial evidence 
establishing that the informant was credible in his testimony about the sales. 
Such evidence included testimony that the informant did not have 
methamphetamine on his person before going to Phillips' house, that the police 
recorded the transactions, and that the informant's actions were observed and 
monitored to the extent reasonably possible by the police. (Trial Tr., p. 32, L. 11 
- p. 40, L. 22; p. 46, L. 10 - p. 50, L. 19; p. 53, L. 22 - p. 54, L. 11; p. 94, L. 18 -
p. 100, L. 1; p. 101, L. 15 - p. 104, L. 13; p. 125, L. 17 - p. 132, L. 9.) Evidence 
that Phillips discussed future drug transactions during the charged drug 
transactions was part of the circumstantial evidence bolstering the informant's 
testimony that in fact Phillips sold him the methamphetamine he later turned over 
to the police. The evidence was highly probative because, if the informant was 
somehow framing Phillips for the sales on March 3 and 12, or if Phillips was only 
present and not participating in the sales, it is highly unlikely that Phillips would 
be agreeing to consider future drug sales with the informant. Phillips' argument 
that evidence of her conversation about potential future drug sales does not 
make it more likely that she was in fact participating in a current drug sale as 
testified to by the informant (Appellant's brief, p. 5) is without merit. 
Nor has Phillips demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion 
in balancing probative value against potential prejudice. Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, 
relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the district court's discretion, the danger 
of unfair prejudice-which is the tendency to suggest a decision on an improper 
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basis-substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. State v. 
Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 
651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 907 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 
656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 1993). "Under the rule, the evidence is only 
excluded if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. The rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant 
evidence." State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 
(1990) (emphasis in original). 
Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely 
prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to a party's case. See State v. 
Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P .2d 599, 604 (1989) ("Certainly that evidence 
was prejudicial to the defendant, however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial is 
demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in 
prejudice to a defendant."). Rather, the rule protects only against evidence that 
is unfairly prejudicial, that is, evidence that tends to suggest a decision on an 
improper basis. Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908. 
Phillips has established no unfair prejudice. She claims that the evidence 
painted her as a "very dangerous drug dealer" and a "substantial threat to 
society." (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.) The evidence supporting the state's 
allegations already established her as a drug dealer, however, who had twice 
sold approximately an ounce of methamphetamine to the informant. That she 
would plan with the informant future sales of up to four more ounces hardly put 
her in worse light. The evidence was not unfairly prejudicial as it did not show 
7 
any plans or proclivity to do anything other than what she had already done. 
Even if the evidence could be deemed prejudicial Phillips has failed to establish 
that any such potential prejudice so outweighed the probative value of the 
evidence that the district court abused its discretion in admitting it. 
Phillips' argument that the evidence was irrelevant is without merit. She 
has likewise failed to establish unfair prejudice or an abuse of discretion. 
11. 
Phillips Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
The district court sentenced Phillips to consecutive terms of ten years with 
three years fixed on each count of delivery of methamphetamine. (R., pp. 203-
05.) On appeal Phillips argues that the district court did not "properly consider 
the mitigating factors." (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Thus, Phillips contends, the court 
abused its sentencing discretion when it imposed the sentence and again when it 
denied Phillips' motion to reduce the sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11, 13.) 
Phillips' argument fails because she at no point addresses the evidence 
presented at the sentencing hearing or the district court's factual findings. (See 
Appellant's brief, pp. 8-13.) Review of all the facts balanced by the district court 
shows no abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 
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722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 
50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 
(2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
defendant's probable term of confinement. Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 
391 (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a 
sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 
576,577, 38 P.3d 614,615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 
P.3d 27 (2000)). 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the Court reviews the denial 
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Phillips must "show that the 
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently 
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." J..9.:3 
C. Phillips Has Failed To Show That The Sentences Are An Abuse Of 
Discretion 
In order to demonstrate an abuse of the district court's sentencing 
discretion, Phillips must "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, 
the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment." 
3 Because Phillips' Rule 35 motion contained only argument and no additional 
evidence or other sentencing materials (Augmentation) the state will make no 
separate argument that denial of the Rule 35 motion was an abuse of discretion, 
but instead incorporates this issue within the overall argument that the trial court 
did not abuse its sentencing discretion when it originally imposed sentence. 
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State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives 
are: "(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The 
potential sentence in this case was up to fixed life on each count. I.C. § 37-
2732(a)( 1 )(a). 
At the sentencing hearing the state presented evidence that Phillips had 
been selling methamphetamine on a nearly daily basis for years to several lower-
level distributors. (Sentencing Tr., p. 7, L. 16 - p. 14, L. 8.) The court found that 
the evidence indicated that, after a loss of a business by fire, Phillips had been 
supporting herself by methamphetamine sales. (Sentencing Tr., p. 34, L. 23 - p. 
35, L. 5.) Phillips fails to mention the evidence and finding that she had been 
supporting her "life and lifestyle with the sales of methamphetamine" (Sentencing 
Tr., p. 35, Ls. 4-5) in her appellate argument, instead relying on the factual claim 
she made (and the district court rejected) that she was only "support[ing] her 
habit." (Appellant's brief, p. 9.) 
Phillips also fails to acknowledge that the district court expressly 
considered several of the factors she argues on appeal are mitigating. The court 
considered Phillips' lack of a significant record, finding it "remarkable[J" that it was 
so limited. (Sentencing Tr., p. 35, Ls. 6-10.) The court accepted Phillips' claim of 
remorse as "sincere and well intentioned." (Sentencing Tr., p. 35, Ls. 11-13.) 
The court also expressly considered the pre-sentence investigator's 
recommendation of retained jurisdiction and the mental health evaluation finding 
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of a major depressive disorder and amphetamine dependence. (Sentencing Tr., 
p. 35, Ls. 13-19.) The district court found the mitigation of these factors limited, 
however, by the fact Phillips ignores: that Phillips had for some time been making 
her living from methamphetamine sales. {Sentencing Tr., p. 36, Ls. 3-15.) The 
court also found that the harm caused by Phillips' actions in dealing 
methamphetamine was considerable and that she was a "significant player in 
introducing and spreading that type of destruction into this community." 
(Sentencing Tr., p. 36, Ls. 16-24.) 
In the end the trial court did weigh the mitigating factors Phillips has 
articulated on appeal, and then balanced them with the factors Phillips ignores, 
and concluded that a prison sentence was called for. (Sentencing Tr., p. 37, L. 
12 - p. 38, L. 13.) Phillips has failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
judgment of conviction. 
DATED this 23rd day of March, 2012. 
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